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As humans, we tend to perceive minds in both living and non-living entities, such as
robots. From a questionnaire developed in a previous mind perception study, authors
found that perceived minds could be located on two dimensions “experience” and
“agency.” This questionnaire allowed the assessment of how we perceive minds of
various entities from a multi-dimensional point of view. In this questionnaire, subjects
had to evaluate explicit mental capacities of target characters (e.g., capacity to feel
hunger). However, we sometimes perceive minds in non-living entities, even though
we cannot attribute these evidently biological capacities to the entity. In this study,
we performed a large-scale web survey to assess mind perception by using the
semantic differential scale method. We revealed that two mind dimensions “emotion”
and “intelligence,” respectively, corresponded to the two mind dimensions (experience
and agency) proposed in a previous mind perception study. We did this without having
to ask about specific mental capacities. We believe that the semantic differential scale
is a useful method to assess the dimensions of mind perception especially for non-living
entities that are hard to be attributed to biological capacities.
Keywords: mind perception, non-living entities, robots, semantic differential scale method, agency, experience,
animism
INTRODUCTION
Legend has it that Saint Francis of Assisi thought that, like humans, all non-human animals, had
minds and he communicated with them (Zanker, 2007). It is not only saints who perceive minds
in non-human animals but the rest of us often do so on a day-to-day basis in different animals,
such as monkeys, dogs, cats, and so on. Mind perception is not limited to living creatures. A wide
variety of artificial entities (e.g., interactive robots) and natural phenomenon (e.g., the north wind
and the sun in an Aesop’s fable) are sometimes treated as having a mind. This does not, however,
mean that people of different ages and cultures share the same type of concept of the mind and the
same attitudes toward the mind. For example, some Japanese people, following traditional Japanese
conventions, believe that material objects (e.g., dolls and scissors) that have been used for a long
time, develop minds and these people often hold a memorial ceremony for these objects when they
dispose of them. By contrast, this idea that “inanimate objects have minds” is hard to make sense of
in traditional Christian culture because a mind is considered a special gift from God, and artificial
entities are denied a mind. Hence, it is important to investigate how we perceive minds in living
and non-living entities for the purpose of understanding the diversity of human cultures (Kraft,
1995).
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Questionnaire assessments are mainly used in the study
of mind perception. One of the landmark studies of mind
perception, conducted by Gray et al. (2007), used a large-scale
web survey to analyze mind perception styles in over 2000
respondents. In this study, subjects were asked to rate the degree
to which each of the 18 mental capacities (e.g., capacity to
feel hunger) was suitable for explaining each of the 13 target
characters (e.g., adult males, infants, dogs, and gods) on a 5-point
Likert scale. The result of the study was that two orthogonal mind
dimensions, named “experience” and “agency,” respectively, were
found by principle component analyses (PCA). The dimension
of “experience” indicates the capacity to sense and feel emotions,
whereas the dimension of “agency” indicates the capacity to plan
and execute intentional actions. For example, according to Gray
et al.’s survey, we perceive strong “experience” but not “agency” in
babies and other animals; on the contrary, we perceive “agency”
but not “experience” in robots and gods. The multi-dimensional
views of mind perception have been confirmed by other studies
and several derivative findings, leading to the agreement that this
is a good framework for explaining psychological phenomena,
such as the “uncanny valley” and cognitive distortions of
psychiatric disorders (Gray et al., 2011; Gray and Wegner, 2012).
Although the two mind dimensions proposed by Gray and
colleagues are insightful, it is not easy to apply the questionnaire
they used to measure mind perception toward non-living entities,
e.g., robots. In their questionnaire, subjects were instructed to
rate the degree to which a mental (biological) capacity was
matched with a character. For example, subjects were asked
“To what degree does a robot have a capacity to feel hunger?”
The questionnaire, however, does not differentiate between what
impression we have of and what we know about an entity.
The subjects’ rating may be heavily influenced by their prior
knowledge about robots, e.g., knowledge that robots are not
capable of feeling hunger. To differentiate between what we
mean by “impression” and “knowledge” of an entity, imagine
the case in which a person meets a human-like android and
has a strong first impression that the android feels hunger. In
this case, one may perceive a mind in the android. At the same
time, however, one knows that the android is a machine and
does not have the capacity to feel hunger. This knowledge may
prevent a person from forming a spontaneous mind perception.
Most items included in Gray and colleagues’ questionnaire are
concerned with mental capacities that only biological entities
have. Subjects arguably have knowledge that these capacities are
not implemented in non-living entities, and are forced to answer
the questionnaire in a biased way. Sometimes we inevitably
form an impression of an object and we assume the behavior
comes from a mind. Hence, we need to exclude the effects of
prior knowledge to investigate mind perception toward non-
living entities, insofar as mind perception is associated with
impression. The questionnaire used by Gray et al. is designed to
measure one’s general conceptions of mental capacities of entities.
A different questionnaire may be appropriate for assessing our
mind perception.
We suggest that a semantic differential scale method could
reveal multidimensional aspects of mind perception (Bradley and
Lang, 1994). This scale does not include questions concerning
mental capacities and is capable of assessing subject’s non-verbal
impressions of various objects, events, and concepts on the basis
of how they rate the matching between multiple adjectives and
entities. In this method, an adjective is paired with its antonym
and the two adjectives are assigned numbers on a scale. For
example, “cold” is paired with “warm,” and they are given 1
and 7, respectively. Subjects were asked to evaluate where an
entity is placed on the scale. In a previous study, we found that
mind perception varies along two mind dimensions by using a
questionnaire that included 21 paired-adjectives (Takahashi et al.,
2014). The questionnaire we used was limited in generality and
target; it mainly focused on brain activities in mind perception.
The sample size in this previous study was small (n= 20) and the
mean age of sample (university students) was a little biased. More
importantly, we did not show that the two dimensions we found
(i.e., mind-holderness and mind-readerness) corresponded to
the two dimensions of “experience” and “agency” introduced by
Gray and colleagues. By showing that the former dimensions
correspond to the latter, we propose that our semantic differential
scale is an effective way to detect the dimensions of “agency” and
“experience” of mind perception.
In the current study, we performed a large-scale web survey
in subjects of varying ages to generalize the two dimensions
of our questionnaire. In this survey, subjects evaluated seven
target characters by both the questionnaires of Gray et al. (2007)
and of Takahashi et al. (2014). The results of the study suggest
that the two dimensions found in our questionnaire correspond
to the two mind dimensions of “experience” and “agency.”
Our semantic differential scale can therefore be regarded as an
effective way to intuitively assess multidimensional aspects of
mind perception without asking questions about evident mental
capacities.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Five hundred healthy Japanese subjects were recruited through an
Internet survey service (Cross Marketing Co., Japan). The ages of
subjects were uniformly distributed in the range of 17–75 years
(mean = 45.0, SD = 18.9) and the gender ratio of subjects were
equally divided regardless of their ages. This study was carried
out with written informed consent from all subjects in accordance
with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Procedures
Subjects were asked to evaluate mind capacities and impressions
of seven targets, respectively (an adult friend, a baby, a frog, a tree,
a communication robot, a super computer and a god) by using
both the questionnaires by Gray et al. (2007) and by Takahashi
et al. (2014) on the internet website specially designed for this
survey. Information of these targets was presented only using
words, without pictures and the orders of the target presentation
were randomized among subjects. In the questionnaire used by
Gray et al. (2007), the measurement included 18 questions and
subjects rated the degree to which eighteen mental capacities were
suitable to explain the capacity of a target character on a 5-point
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Likert scale where 1 was “not suitable” and 5 was “very suitable.”
In the questionnaire used in Takahashi et al. (2014), 21 pairs of
two opposing adjectives were presented and subjects rated on a
7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (a left side adjective is well
matched) to 7 (a right side adjective is well matched) to express
the suitable impression of target characters.
RESULTS
We performed a PCA for rating scores of the two questionnaires
to identify dimensions of each. PCA is a statistical procedure
for an orthogonal transformation to convert a set of original
multidimensional data into small number of orthogonal factors
called principal components (details are seen in Holand, 2008).
This method is suitable to extract specific factors related to
mind perception from multiple questions in questionnaires. We
found two factors with eigenvalues over 1.0 in the questionnaire
by Gray et al. (2007), a factor corresponding to “Experience”
(eigenvalue = 11.4) accounted for 63.4% and a second factor,
“Agency” (eigenvalue= 2.2), accounted for 12.3% of the variance
(detail loads of questions in each component are reported in
Table 1). Furthermore, three factors with eigenvalues over 1.0
were found in the questionnaire used by Takahashi et al. (2014)
a factor named “Emotion” (eigenvalue = 11.6) accounted for
55.1% of the variance, a second factor named “intelligence”
(eigenvalue = 3.0), accounted for 14.3% of the variance and a
third factor (eigenvalue= 1.0), accounted for 4.9% of the variance
(detail loads of questions in each component are reported in
Table 2). Results of semantic differential scale methods are often
compressed into three components by using factor analysis.
However, there were no significant correlations between this
third component and the other two components in Gray et al.
(2007). Hence, we do not discuss the third component in this
paper.
We plotted mean scores of the PCA of the two questionnaires
(Figure 1). We found that the locations of all characters in the
two dimensions were similar between the two questionnaires. We
calculated the correlation coefficients between “experience” and
“emotion” and between “agency” and “intelligence,” respectively.
Both values are positive and stochastic (“experience” and
“emotion” r = 0.80, p < 0.00001, “experience” and “emotion”
r= 0.75, p< 0.00001) and we concluded that the two dimensions
revealed by the semantic differential scale method were similar
to the two dimensions revealed from questions about mental
capacities.
Furthermore, we investigated whether subject’s ages were
correlated with these PCA components in each target and we
found there were no significant correlations between ages and any
dimensions of mind perception.
DISCUSSION
In this study, we directly compared two different types of
questionnaires used for assessing mind perception. One asked
about mental capacities and the other asked about impressions
TABLE 1 | Two components in Takahashi et al., 2014 (eigenvalues over 1.0).
Mental Capacity 1st (experience) 2nd (agency)
Hunger 0.679 −0.567
Fear 0.765 −0.485
Pain 0.761 −0.522
Pleasure 0.860 −0.241
Rage 0.859 −0.233
Desire 0.872 −0.166
Personality 0.842 −0.040
Consciousness 0.885 −0.073
Pride 0.836 0.146
Embarrassment 0.852 −0.127
Joy 0.866 −0.210
Self-control 0.753 0.400
Morality 0.755 0.392
Memory 0.620 0.472
Emotion recognition 0.840 0.200
Planning 0.651 0.585
Communication 0.788 0.262
Thought 0.778 0.419
TABLE 2 | Three components in Takahashi et al., 2014 (eigenvalues over
1.0).
Left
adjective
Right
adjective
1st
(emotion)
2nd
(intelligence)
3rd
Mechanical Humanlike 0.757 −0.235 −0.332
Unintelligent Intelligent 0.632 0.489 −0.077
Unethical Ethical 0.687 0.537 −0.040
Bad Nice 0.871 0.142 −0.110
Uncute Cute 0.763 −0.353 −0.213
Unfriendly Friendly 0.816 −0.299 −0.142
Inactive Active 0.823 −0.256 −0.066
Negative Positive 0.858 −0.118 −0.086
Unkind Kind 0.854 0.233 −0.097
Cold Warm 0.831 −0.151 −0.132
Uncurious Curious 0.842 −0.216 −0.179
Shortsight Longsight 0.814 0.343 0.015
Emotionally
unstable
Emotionally
stable
0.691 0.463 0.269
Irrational Rational 0.727 0.534 0.144
Irresponsible Responsible 0.736 0.485 0.086
Unbiological Biological 0.565 −0.586 0.311
Unconscious Conscious 0.808 −0.235 0.060
Irregular Regular 0.589 0.400 0.357
Unnatural Natural 0.515 −0.509 0.472
Complex Simple 0.503 −0.422 0.444
Unemotional Emotional 0.732 −0.378 −0.128
of targets by using the semantic differential scale method. From
our results, we suggest that the two mind dimensions “emotion”
and “intelligence” revealed in our questionnaire correspond to
the dimensions “experience” and “agency” in Gray et al. (2007)
questionnaire. This means that we can assesses mind perception
without asking questions about mental capacities but by using the
semantic differential scale method.
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FIGURE 1 | Locations of target characters in two mind dimensions.
We consider the semantic differential scale method useful,
especially when it comes to assessing multidimensional aspects
of mind perception for artificial agents such as robots that are
difficult to attribute mental (biological) capacities to but that
we sometimes feel have a mind. Various new types of robots
are being developed that are expected to communicate with
us as living partners (Imai et al., 2003). We also know that
attributing minds to inanimate agents improves trustworthiness
and empathy toward these agents (Riek et al., 2009; Harrison
and Hall, 2010; Waytz et al., 2014). These social emotions are
essential to creating a good rapport between human and artificial
agents. Hence, when we develop a social agent, it is important
to evaluate how people perceive the mind in the agent. As our
questionnaire does not include questions about mental capacities,
our questionnaire can be broadly applied to the assessment of
mind perception for various agents in human-robot or human-
agent interaction studies.
Our study can be considered a Japanese retest of Gray et al.
(2007) mind perception survey. Although the results obtained
by Gray et al. (2007) and our results are relatively similar,
results in artificial, inanimate objects were different between
these two surveys. In our study, scores of “agency” (intelligence)
in robots and super computers are higher than those in adult
humans. Contrastingly, the scores of agency in robots were
underestimated in Gray et al. (2007, 2011). We hypothesize that
Japanese people might attribute stronger agency (intelligence)
to artificial entities when compared to westerners. In some
cultures, including Japan, people tend to believe non-living
things have a mind, even if these things cannot be attributed
to evident biological capacities. Furthermore, regardless of
culture, young children tend to attribute mental states to
non-living entities. For example, many children treat stuffed
animals as their friends (Moriguchi et al., 2015). Moreover, some
children have invisible friends called “imaginary companions”
and communicate with them much like with actual human
friends (Moriguchi and Shinohara, 2012). These beliefs about
minds in non-living entities are often called “animism” (Harvey,
2005). Animism is the cultural attitude toward nature and
external objects. Hence, this concept is strongly linked to views
of life and religions in various cultures and the assessment
of mind perception is quite important to understand cultural
difference of these views. However, the sense of animacy is
intuitive feeling and this sense cannot be explained logically.
Therefore, the questionnaire that directly asks about mental
capacities might not be appropriate for the assessment of mind
perception in animism culture. We believe that the assessment
of mind perception by using the semantic differential scale
method is an intuitive way to assess subject’s impressions and
this method is suitable to assess mind perception universally
regardless of cultural differences. Further, because the abilities for
processing other’s mind are often distorted in various psychiatric
disorders (e.g., schizophrenia), our intuitive method might be
useful for assessing these patient’s symptoms (Matsumoto et al.,
2015).
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